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Navigation Acts in the American Colonies 
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AbstrAct
From its insular location, its limited indigenous resources and its subordinate political 
standing as one of three kingdoms ruled by the Stuart dynasty, Scotland was dependent 
on overseas trade, commercial networks and an entrepreneurial willingness to set aside 
international regulations for its very survival as a distinctive European nation in the later 
17th century. Scotland was manifestly not a major European power, nor a significant im-
perial presence in the Americas. By the later 17th century, however, colonial endeavours 
were offering Scots the opportunity not just to break out from the mercantilist dominance 
of the great European powers, but also to sustain regal union under a common monarchy 
without recourse to political incorporation with England. By the 1690s, the clannish cohe-
sion of their landed and commercial elite, their diligence in securing positions of influence 
and their collusive disregard for the Navigation Acts were perceived by English merchants, 
colonial officials, diplomats and ruling ministries as highly threatening. The Scots chal-
lenged the English state through their Darien Scheme to create an international entrepôt 
for the Pacific as well as the Atlantic on the Panama Isthmus, as through their expansion 
into Ireland and the Delaware Basin. If the Scots made a success of Darien, there seemed a 
real prospect to vested English interests that their domestic market would grow to include 
Ireland and that their entrepreneurial endeavours in the Delaware would lead to the seces-
sion of three counties to form a Scottish colony on the American mainland. Only political 
incorporation, through the Treaty of Union in 1707, seemingly put an end to Scottish flout-
ing of English state power.
The demarcation of the early modern from the medieval period was greatly influenced by 
issues of religion and jurisdiction which were integral to state formation. Both Scotland 
and England, as Protestant powers, were to claim exclusive sovereignty in and around 
their respective territories in the British Isles. However, the situation was complicated 
by the establishment of a common monarchy, when James VI of Scotland became James 
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I of England in 1603. As the English Parliament remained hostile to political and com-
mercial union, no British state was formally created despite the endeavours of James to 
promote himself at home and abroad as king of Great Britain and Ireland, possessed 
of an exclusive right of empire by land and sea. In the course of the revolutions against 
his son Charles I in the 1640s, Scots took the political initiative to secure recognition 
from the Stuart monarchy and the English Parliament that they were an independent, 
sovereign state. Nevertheless, civil wars and political schisms led to a republican regime 
in England that coerced Scotland, along with Ireland, into first a Commonwealth then 
a Protectorate under Oliver Cromwell. Although the common monarchy was restored 
under Charles II in 1660, the English state as represented by its Privy Council as the 
executive and its Parliament as the legislature, was intent on a distinctive commercial 
policy that discriminated as much against the Scots as the Dutch or the French. A series 
of Navigation Acts signposted that issues of political economy, designed to secure na-
tional prosperity, were becoming vital, modernising aspects of state formation. In this 
situation, Scottish independence was becoming parlous1. Its insular location, its limited 
indigenous resources and its subordinate political standing to England meant its very 
survival as a distinctive European nation in the later 17th century became dependent 
on overseas trade, commercial networks and an entrepreneurial willingness to set aside 
English and other international regulations. England saw the legislative protection of 
its overseas trade and shipping as necessary for both its security as a state and its expan-
sion as a global power. Scotland lacked the political clout to dismantle the legislative 
protection associated with mercantilism as exercised by England and the other leading 
European powers. Nevertheless Scottish politicians, merchants and colonial adventur-
ers became adept at circumventing mercantilist restrictions inimical to their trade and 
commerce. Notwithstanding being castigated as a rogue nation, non-compliance to 
English laws became their watchword. The American colonies became the main theatre 
for their resistance to discriminatory laws.
Despite ongoing transatlantic reappraisal of the British nature of the American colo-
nies, the continuity and vitality of commercial links between Scotland and the Ameri-
cas from the 1620s have been relatively underplayed2. Certainly, Scotland was mani-
festly not a major European power, nor a significant imperial presence in the Americas. 
Nevertheless, by the later 17th century colonial endeavours were offering Scots the op-
portunity not just to break out from the mercantilist dominance of England and the 
other great European powers, but also to sustain regal union under a common monar-
chy without recourse to political incorporation. By the 1690s, the clannish cohesion 
of the Scottish landed and commercial elite, their diligence in securing positions of 
influence in the Americas and their collusive disregard for the Navigation Acts were 
perceived by English merchants, colonial officials, diplomats and ruling ministries as 
highly threatening.
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commerciAl discriminAtion
The extent to which the Restoration of Charles II marked a return to the promotion 
of an organic and inclusive civic society under a common Stuart monarchy remains 
questionable. The continuing political dominance of England threatened that Scot-
land, despite the formal restoration of its independence would, like Ireland, become 
a permanent political satellite3. In reality, restored Stuart rule over the three kingdoms 
represented a compromise between what may be termed normatively the Britannic 
and Gothic perspectives. The Britannic was grounded in an imperial vision, which 
ensured that Britain was always something more than the kingdom of England; the 
prerogative powers of the monarchy allowed them to suspend or dispense with laws 
inimical to other constituent interests within the British Isles. The Gothic was rooted 
in an English parliament with sole powers to vote supply and enact statutes that rein-
forced the English common law. Accordingly, the Gothic proponents of the supremacy 
of parliamentary statute and the common law placed contractual emphasis on rights, 
liberties and privileges which were applicable to all free born Englishmen, but were 
exclusively English at the expense of differing Scottish legal traditions or Irish customs4. 
The inclusive Britannic perspective of the monarchy was highlighted by the Dutch aca-
demic, Rutgerius Hermannides in his Britannia Magna of 1661, which nevertheless 
chronicled English hegemony over Scotland and Ireland. The German jurist, Samuel 
von Pufendorf, who came to view England as a composite monarchy with Scottish and 
Irish dependencies, forcibly articulated the exclusive Gothic perspective. Charles II was 
carrying on the mantle of Oliver Cromwell and his republican regime of the 1650s in 
maintaining English greatness through dominion over the seas and the promotion of 
commerce5.
The dice seemed loaded firmly in favour of the Gothic perspective in relation to com-
mercial access to the American colonies of the common monarchy. The English Privy 
Council was restored as the king’s executive agency for the government of the domin-
ions as well as England. Reporting to this Council were permanent commissions for 
Trade and the Plantations, which followed Cromwellian precedent by involving mer-
chants, mainly from the city of London, planters and sea-captains as well as royal advis-
ers and by according no place for Scots, other than the less than benign influence of 
James Maitland, 2nd Earl (later 1st Duke) of Lauderdale as the autocratic manager for 
Scottish affairs. Scots in England and in the colonies were accorded the same rights as 
Englishmen so long as they lived under English jurisdiction. But, Scots based in Scot-
land and trading to and from the American colonies were treated as foreigners and 
aliens by the Navigation Acts promulgated in 1660 and 1663. This legislation was sub-
sequently modified and explained but not essentially altered by further enactments in 
1662, 1670, 1671 and 1673.
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The purpose of these Acts was distinctly mercantilist: to advance overseas commerce, 
increase royal revenue and regulate the colonies on the one hand and promote ship-
ping, manufacturing and a favourable balance of trade on the other. The Act of 1660 
specified that no goods or commodities regardless of where they were produced could 
be imported into or exported out of any English plantation except in a ship built in 
England or the plantations whose master and three-quarters of the crew were English. 
The same Act enumerated colonial commodities, basically raw materials and produce 
that were to be exclusively traded through English markets. No direct trade was to be 
permitted between continental Europe and the American colonies. The Act of 1663 
stated that England was to be the staple for all European goods imported into the colo-
nies and all masters of ships sailing for the colonies were obliged to provide a detailed 
manifest of their ships and cargoes on arrival and lodge a bond for payment of customs 
in England prior to their departure6.
However the Britannic perspective was not entirely lost under Charles II. After the first 
imposition of the Navigation Acts, Charles II had used his prerogative powers to grant 
individual dispensations to entrepreneurs wishing to sustain sugar works in Glasgow 
and later in Edinburgh through trade to the American colonies. The development of 
these manufactures demonstrates the active involvement of Scots, notwithstanding the 
English Acts, in the transatlantic trade to the West Indies as to the Chesapeake and the 
Delaware for tobacco. As the Stuarts’ overseas dominions in the Americas expanded in 
the Restoration era, so did assiduous commercial networking by Scottish entrepreneurs 
from Boston to New York and on to Philadelphia by the 1680s. Glasgow, which had 
developed Port Glasgow further down the Clyde as its Atlantic gateway in 1667, main-
tained a position of leadership in transatlantic trade, which stimulated engagement not 
only by Ayr but also by lesser ports such as Dumfries in the south and Irvine, Greenock 
and Dumbarton in the west. Consortia from Edinburgh soon followed through the 
port of Leith in regular commerce with the Americas, which, in turn, stimulated the 
engagement of such neighbouring east coast towns as Prestonpans, Burntisland, and 
Kirkcaldy as well as Bo’ness on the Firth of Forth. In terms of further engagement with 
the Atlantic economy, Perth joined Dundee from Tayside, while Montrose and Peter-
head supplemented the endeavours of Aberdeen in the north-east, as did Inverness in 
the Highlands and even Stromness in the Orkney Isles by the 1680s7.
As Duke of York, the future James II had played a key public role in upholding an inclu-
sive, Britannic perspective for imperial monarchy. James was instrumental in using the 
Crown’s prerogative powers to suspend laws restricting Scottish participation in Eng-
lish overseas ventures. The issuing of letters of marque to Scottish privateers, the press-
ing of Scots into service in the Royal Navy and the less than welcome conscription of 
Scots seamen to serve in the Second (1666-7) and Third (1672-74) Dutch Wars against 
their main commercial partner further encouraged a laxity in applying trading prohibi-
tions. Having been awarded New York as a colony on its wresting from the Dutch in 
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1664, James had been an assiduous and tolerant promoter of a durable Scottish and 
Dutch commercial network that was based in Albany, named after his Scottish ducal 
title. James also took the initiative in encouraging the extensive settlement of Scots on 
the lower Delaware, a district hitherto settled mainly by Danes, Swedes and Finns that 
had not been included in his original proprietary grant of New York, but was acquired 
by conquest in 16648.
Royal patronage notwithstanding, enhanced Scottish activity can be attributed pri-
marily to accumulating commercial expertise and sophistication in circumventing the 
Navigation Acts. Scottish endeavours to have the Acts suspended were peremptorily 
rejected in 1661 because of perennial English fears about the competitive edge enjoyed 
by the Scottish ships engaged in the carrying trade. Nevertheless, the Acts themselves 
contained significant loopholes and exemptions that could be exploited by Scottish en-
trepreneurs who took advantage of flexible arrangements for the loading and unloading 
of colonial commodities which could be undertaken in the sea-lanes rather than just 
at the port of Berwick-upon-Tweed on the eastern English border9. Direct shipments 
to and from the Scottish ports on the Firth of Forth nominally cleared English cus-
toms in the Holy Isles. As long as ships were allowed to land colonial goods in Ireland, 
the North Channel served the same purpose for ports in the west of Scotland intent 
on trade with the Americas. There were three areas exempt from the Navigation Acts 
– Newfoundland, where there was a lucrative trade in fish to Spain, Portugal and the 
Italian states; Guinea, the centre of the African slave trade; and Delaware, the district 
contested by Maryland, the Dutch and Swedes which remained exempt when incor-
porated into New York in 1664. This latter area was of greatest significance to Scottish 
commercial engagement in the tobacco trade.
No less pertinently, there were three key exceptions to the staple provision that all goods 
had to be exported from England – salt for the fisheries of Newfoundland and New 
England; servants, horses and provisions from Scotland as well as Ireland; and, in keep-
ing with Charles II’s marriage treaty with Catherine of Braganza in 1662, wines from 
the Portuguese islands of Madeira and the Azores. A steady supply of political prisoners 
featured on the individual dispensations given to Scottish consortia to trade with the 
Americas. More significantly, these exemptions encouraged tramp trading; that is, the 
conveying of goods to and from several ports rather than directly across the Atlantic. 
Tramping, which was the prevailing form of Scottish commerce in the Baltic, was now 
transferred to the Caribbean and the north Atlantic. Tramping was further encouraged 
by the concession that ships could trade freely between the colonies in the Americas, 
a trading practice not checked by the imposition of inter-colonial duties from 1673, 
not least because of the limited number of colonial officials in place or willing to col-
lect these taxes. The need to provide bonds specifying ships and cargoes to and from 
the Americas was circumvented by transferring bonds from legitimate English to illicit 
Scottish shipping, by outright forgery, by disguised ownership, by smuggling and by 
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collusion with colonial officials. Such practices became the stock in trade of Scottish 
commercial networks operating in the Americas whose vitality has tended to be under-
played by disparate patterns of Scottish immigration and settlement in the colonies10.
scottish networking
Networks headed by London Scots that traded legitimately with the colonies, had the 
added bonus of enrolling their ships in convoys protected by the Royal Navy. However, 
Scottish entrepreneurs and their colonial associates were no less willing to use Rot-
terdam, Amsterdam and even Hamburg as commercial hubs. The Atlantic connection 
certainly contributed to the reinvigoration of Scottish networks in Bordeaux and their 
installation in Lisbon and Cadiz/Seville by the 1680s. The Irish ports of Belfast and 
Londonderry were locked into the Scottish transatlantic as well as the Baltic carry-
ing trade. Whereas established colonial merchants in such English cities as Bristol had 
found themselves on the defensive by the 1650s from interlopers intent on the free 
trade in indentured servants, Scottish engagement with the Atlantic trade raised inter-
loping from an urban to a national endeavour in the Restoration era. At the same time, 
there was steady pressure from the colonies for Scots to serve in the Caribbean as serv-
ants and in the Chesapeake and Delaware as frontiersmen. Highlanders especially were 
viewed as excelling in the latter role, but able-bodied men from all districts of Scotland 
were welcome to rebuild societies devastated by hurricanes and increasingly fearing in-
ternal upheaval from revolts as slavery increased exponentially with the profitability of 
sugar and rum. External threats from the French, the Spanish and the Dutch also had 
to be faced. Barbados, which was to the fore in providing settlers to consolidate Jamaica 
– forcibly acquired from Spain by the Cromwellian regime in 1655 – and extend the 
Stuarts’ dominions in North and South Carolina, was the main promoter of Scottish 
immigration and open trade through Scottish commercial networks11.
Scottish networks, however, did not confine their commercial activities in the Car-
ibbean to the Stuart dominions. In ventures to the Lesser Antilles throughout the 
Restoration era they traded sporadically with the Dutch, the French and the Danes. 
Moreover, Scottish entrepreneurs were considerably more flexible than the English in 
switching political allegiance. The Scots readily transferred over from the Dutch to the 
English in New York in 1664 and again after a brief period of Dutch reconquest in 
1673. Yet, the Scottish planting elite in Surinam not only accepted Dutch control from 
1667, but also actively connived with the Dutch authorities to expropriate disaffected 
English planters12.
Networks based on ties of kinship and local association were no more exclusively Scot-
tish in North America than in northern Europe. Indeed, even where networks were 
predominantly Scottish, they were not always complementary and were occasionally 
involved in antagonistic sharp practices13. However, colonial officials from New Hamp-
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shire to South Carolina noted the clannish cohesion as well as the acquisitiveness of 
Scottish entrepreneurs who consistently outsold English competitors by focusing on 
quantity rather than quality in marketing goods for servants and slaves. In Delaware 
especially, Scottish networks came to dominate the three southern counties of New 
Castle, Kent and Sussex. The Scots took advantage of these counties being regularly 
contested between Maryland and initially New York, then Pennsylvania. The issue was 
decided in favour of William Penn’s colony in 1685. By then, the Scots were viewed 
as a greater threat to the operation of the Navigation Acts than either the Dutch, or 
even the Caribbean buccaneers. Local initiatives by English colonial officials to have 
the Scots declared foreigners and aliens incapable of wholesale trading or holding pub-
lic office were summarily thrown out by court officials and juries who tended to think 
“that Scotchmen are as free as Englishmen”.
Scottish networks in the Americas were usually dominated by literate laymen not 
averse to litigation and willing to represent each other in a diversity of jurisdictions 
covering commerce by land and sea through provincial and county courts as in courts 
of assistants, of common rights and of chancery. These networks were also able to take 
advantage of differing traditions of jurisprudence and legal practice in the colonies. 
In the middle colonies of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and, to a lesser extent, 
Maryland, the normal practice of conforming to English statute and common law had 
to take account of Dutch and Scottish affinities for and grounding in civil law. Moreo-
ver, in all colonies from New England to the Carolinas, juries became notorious in the 
eyes of English officials for their disregard of the alleged facts in returning, even with 
repeated redirection, not guilty verdicts against practised evaders of the Navigation 
Acts14. Concerns about the autonomy of Scottish commercial networks were height-
ened by their endeavours to establish Scottish colonies in southern Carolina and east 
New Jersey with full backing from the Scottish Privy Council and the future James II. 
In 1681, James had established a Committee for Trade which subsequently reported to 
the Privy Council that the only effective way for the country to cope with mercantilism 
and growing dependence on English markets was either to seek closer union or develop 
overseas colonies. Nevertheless, there was little political will either at the court (even 
after James II succeeded Charles II), in the English Privy Council, in the Commissions 
of Trade and Plantations, or in the English Parliament to sustain an inclusive Britannic 
agenda within the Stuarts’ dominions. When William of Orange replaced James II in 
all three kingdoms between 1688 and 1691, he took up the Gothic perspective as ex-
tolled by Pufendorf. For the purposes of making peace and war, and conducting trade 
and commerce, the interests of England were paramount. Scotland, like Ireland, was a 
peripheral consideration15.
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coloniAl reApprAisAl
The ‘Glorious Revolution’ that brought William of Orange to power in England can be 
viewed as a Gothic triumph. The Revolution transformed a Britannic Empire based on 
the Stuarts’ royal prerogative into an English Empire subject to constitutional oversight 
by the English Parliament. Yet, the proclaimed achievement of constitutional monar-
chy in place of Stuart autocracy glossed over the continuation of the fiscal-military state 
instigated in the Stuarts’ dominions in the Restoration era. Ostensibly under parlia-
mentary control from the Revolution, military engagements and commercial oppor-
tunism on a global scale were moderated rather than contained by votes of supply and 
were fructified by the creation of the National Debt in 1693 that was financed through 
the Bank of England from 1694. The Revolution was not so much glorious as bloody in 
the other two kingdoms16. Scots were markedly disadvantaged in both the British Isles 
and the colonies by reinforced Navigation Acts, which instigated a tariff battle with 
England from 1693 until 170717.
Nevertheless, Scottish commercial networks notably exploited the unsettled political 
situation in North America in the wake of the Revolution. Despite the covert placing 
of English customs agents to monitor Scottish shipping, Glasgow merchants were to 
the fore in expanding their operations into North Carolina from whence tobacco was 
shipped either directly to Scotland or to the stores controlled by Scots on the Lower 
Delaware. Glasgow also took the lead in forging documentation to pass off their ship-
ping and their commodity trading as English. Even on the rare occasions when colonial 
officials attempted the strict enforcement of the Navigation Acts, Scottish merchants 
could still charter ships from London and other English ports and travel to the colonies 
as supercargoes responsible for the actual trading of commodities. In cases of doubt, 
colonial juries – even on appeal from county to higher courts - still continued to side 
with commercial networks over Crown officials18.
Although illicit Scottish entrepreneurship in the Americas was still proving remunera-
tive, English commentators on commerce were rethinking the relative importance of 
the colonies. The colonies were making a rather limited fiscal and military contribution 
toward the furtherance of the war effort against France in the American theatre of the 
Nine Years War that had commenced in 168819. To redress this situation, as well as deal 
with disruptive influences on colonial commerce, the Council for Trade and Planta-
tions was established in 1696. In essence, the Council, or more commonly the Board of 
Trade, professionalized the oversight of the English colonies in America and promoted 
uniformity in their governance. Thus, the inclusive Britannic formula that the colonies 
should be governed by laws “not repugnant” to those of England was supplanted by the 
exclusive Gothic mantra that their laws should “be agreeable” to those of England. In 
keeping with this exclusivity, the Navigation Acts were again reinvigorated with a par-
ticular emphasis on curtailing documentary fraud, promoting probity among officials, 
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and appointing to places of trust in the plantations only natives of England and Ireland, 
which was particularly interpreted as a licence to treat Scots as aliens and incapable of 
public employment, be that civil or military20.
In December 1697 and January 1698, the Board of Trade completed a review of English 
trade from 1670 until the recent Peace of Ryswick with the French. Focusing on com-
mercial exchange, the balance of payments and the competitive impact of mercantilist 
regulation, the Council noted that the expansion of English trade in the Restoration 
era had gone into a measurable decline after the Revolution. Global threats to English 
trade were more pressing than transatlantic opportunities for colonial expansion. Seri-
ous misgivings were expressed about woollen manufacturing, fishing and the carrying 
trade, particularly that from the plantations in the Americas. The un-cooperative pres-
ence of Scottish commercial networks loomed large. Not only was wool necessary for 
English manufacturing being exported out of England, Ireland and Scotland, but Scot-
tish carriers were dominating this trade from the three kingdoms. The Scots were not 
prepared to participate in a common British fishery in competition with the Dutch. In 
the colonies, the Scots were taking particular advantage of the lack of designated ports 
for the loading and unloading of overseas vessels21.
English commercial commentators and merchants were now stating in public what 
English diplomatic and colonial officials were expressing in private. Indeed, the Board 
of Trade had become particularly apprehensive about the purported dominance of 
Scottish commercial networks in Ireland since the Revolution. Not only did Scottish 
merchants in the trading towns and the Scottish gentry in plantation districts actively 
collude, but they “are generally Frugall, Industrious, very nationall, and very helpful to 
each other agst any Third [party]”. Associated claims that an additional 50,000 Scots 
emigrated to Ireland in the 1690s should be viewed as guesstimates rather than esti-
mates. Nevertheless, Scottish dominance of the Irish carrying trade was recognised in 
reports from America. Dublin no less than Belfast and Londonderry was locked into 
Scottish commercial networks during that decade22.
The restructuring of colonial governance in 1696 was actually more impressive on pa-
per than in performance. Not only did designated ports of entry for the collection of 
customs and authentication of trading documents remain inadequate to deal with the 
volume of trade. Policing by frigates cruising in Chesapeake and Delaware Bays also 
proved more expensive than remunerative. Scottish commercial networks became par-
ticularly adept at using their London contacts to attach their ships to Royal Navy con-
voys across the Atlantic and then slipping away under cover of darkness before the ships 
entered the English Channel. Particularly galling for English officials determined to 
curtail Scottish engagement in the Americas was the competitive edge their networks 
enjoyed, which were also diversifying into textile and other manufactures that were 
prohibited colonial endeavours.
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For the Scots, circumvention of the Navigation Acts went hand in glove with commer-
cial innovation. Glasgow merchants used both consignment and store systems first to 
break into the staple Atlantic trade in tobacco and then to secure a position of domi-
nance. Under the consignment system the planter bore the risk of marketing tobacco 
which, though consigned to a merchant house in the British Isles, remained his prop-
erty and therefore his liability until sold. Under the store system the risk of marketing 
was borne by the merchant who transported the tobacco from his colonial store to the 
British Isles. Liability was lessened by tying advances of credit on tobacco sales in Eu-
rope to the purchase of merchandise from the colonial store. The consignment system 
continued to be used by Scots trading through London, but this practice was increas-
ingly challenged both in terms of price and quality by tobacco brought in through the 
stores. This latter system was particularly suited to the expansion of small plantations 
along the Chesapeake and the Delaware into the hinterlands of Maryland, Virginia and 
the Carolinas. It carried higher risks but greater profits. In addition to using White-
haven on the western English border as an outstation of Glasgow, the Isle of Man was 
developed as the major centre of Scottish smuggling operations in the North Channel. 
Colonial commodities brought into Whitehaven were re-exported to Man, giving the 
Scots the benefit of a drawback on customs, and then smuggled into Scotland via the 
Firths of Clyde and Solway or into Belfast, Londonderry and Dublin by Irish associ-
ates. Newcastle as well as Berwick upon Tweed was also brought into play on the east 
coast. Scottish entrepreneurs procured disguised shares in the ownership of transatlan-
tic vessels. Networks immersed in the colonial tramping trade established branches of 
Edinburgh merchant houses on the Tyne. Bilbao and San Sebastian in northern Spain 
also became tramping destinations for Scottish ships engaged in the Newfoundland 
fisheries where they also encountered New England traders carrying enumerated com-
modities for European markets23. Persistent Scottish circumvention of the Navigation 
Acts was instrumental in the English government of William of Orange sabotaging the 
Darien Scheme in the late 1690s.
dArien
The end of the Nine Years War in 1697 caught William III in the horns of a British 
commercial dilemma. Government ministers and officials, merchants and commercial 
commentators were determined to ensure that English not British interests prevailed 
in the colonies as on the continent. William’s Scottish government, however, was by 
no means averse to the promotion of schemes for economic growth. Two flagship en-
deavours were licensed in 1695. The Bank of Scotland and the Company of Scotland 
trading to Africa and the Indies were effectively national co-partneries, that is, joint-
stock companies. When subscription lists were opened in 1696, both the Bank and 
the Company of Scotland attracted respectively individual and corporate pledges for 
£60,000 and £400,000 and sums in hard currency amounting to £6000 and £34,000 
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sterling. As Scotland was also in the grip of an intensive, five-year famine, these levels 
of investment could be taken as indicators of a blind optimism that would destabilise 
a fragile domestic economy. Yet, these subscriptions were not unrealistic in terms of 
inward investment that reflected the close integration of Scottish mercantile communi-
ties at home and abroad24.
Under the far from benign entrepreneurial influence of William Paterson, a leading 
Scottish merchant in London and a founder of the Bank of England, the Company 
of Scotland was persuaded to concentrate its endeavours on an American settlement 
that would serve as an entrepôt capable of attracting trade from the East and West 
Indies through its location on the Panama Isthmus at Darien. Notwithstanding his 
sanctioning of both the Bank of Scotland and the Company of Scotland in 1695, 
William of Orange could not endorse the Darien venture without the support of the 
English parliament. Although the proposed colony did fit the legislative requirement 
that commercial activity was to be conducted in any part of the world not then at war 
with William, the Scottish Company was conceived as a rival to the English East In-
dia Company. Its established block of members in the English Parliament was more 
than capable of impeding William’s need for financial supply. As the legality of English 
residents investing in the Scottish Company was ambivalent, the East India Company, 
with royal approval, successfully pushed through the Houses of Lords and Commons a 
series of hostile measures in December 1695. The threat of impeachment as interlopers 
for any investor resident in England aborted subscriptions to the Company of Scot-
land in London. At the same time, William desired to appease Spain, which claimed 
sovereignty over the Panama Isthmus. As William sought to broker a military alliance 
against Louis XIV, Scottish commercial interests became expendable. Instead of being a 
confederation of Scottish, English, Dutch and northern German commercial interests 
Darien was reduced to a solely Scottish endeavour. William clearly accorded higher 
priority to the balance of power in Europe over the balance of trade in Scotland. The 
Scottish directors, investors and colonists can certainly stand accused of over optimism, 
incompetence and even profiteering. That they were obliged to proceed unilaterally, 
however, turned Darien from a visionary enterprise into a fiasco25.
In denying funding, expertise and assistance to the Company of Scotland, William was 
undoubtedly responding to the real determination within governmental as well as mer-
cantile circles in England that the Darien enterprise should not succeed. Indeed, there 
was a serious concern within government circles (see Source) that if Darien succeeded 
the Scots would lay claim to a settlement on the southern shore of the Delaware Bay, 
especially as they had already established a resident conservator there, Gustavus Hamil-
ton, who oversaw the operation of commercial networks that now stretched from New 
England to southern Carolina. This indigenous mercantile community was not only 
practised in the evasion of the Navigation Acts but deemed capable of establishing an 
independent staple for European manufactures. Darien as a free port would be consid-
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erably more menacing to English interests in America than that operated by the Dutch 
on the island of Curaçao26.
Although English diplomats and colonial officials lined up to sow doubts at home and 
abroad about the legality of the Scottish enterprise, their concerns for the sovereign 
rights of Spain over the Panama Isthmus were far from altruistic and somewhat tem-
pered by the lack of current Spanish settlements in the area and by its suitability for an 
English entrepôt. Indeed, private ventures there by English entrepreneurs had recently 
come to grief prior to the Scots embarking for Darien. Making the area notably attrac-
tive for entrepreneurial exploitation was the fact that the Isthmus carried the overland 
route for the silver mined in Peru prior to its shipping to Spain from Portobello and 
Cartagena. The ill-fated endeavours of the Scots to settle Darien foundered in 1700, 
after successive expeditionary fleets in 1698 and 1699 failed to establish a permanent 
colony. Funded eventually as a national enterprise, as a commercial compact between 
God and the Scottish people, surveying, provisioning and leadership were deficient 
notwithstanding additional assistance provided by Scottish mercantile communities in 
Boston and New York. The defeat of Spanish forces at Tubuganti on 15 February 1700 
by a combined force of Scots and Indians offered no more than a brief respite. English 
polemicists declared open season in ridiculing the audacity of Scottish enterprise. Duly 
glossed over was William’s instruction to the governors of Jamaica and the other Carib-
bean colonies in December 1699 to offer no assistance to the Scots. Spanish tenacity 
on the issue of the Panama Isthmus was wholly underestimated. The fiasco was in no 
small measure due to misplaced British – not just Scottish – disrespect for Spain as ‘the 
sick man of Europe’27.
As Darien turned from a scheme into a fiasco, the call for reparations for the loss of 
£154,000 contributed to a marked deterioration in Anglo-Scottish relations on the 
outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1702. For the Scots, the Darien fiasco 
was an expensive demonstration of the need for purposeful British collaboration. But 
Darien also hastened a major restructuring of English colonial policy. Imperial consoli-
dation became the overriding concern among English commercial commentators and 
colonial officials following the accession of Queen Anne in 1702. Faced with aggressive 
French competition in the Americas, there was a growing realisation that England did 
not have the demographic capacity for overseas expansion without draining its domes-
tic manufactures of labour. Indeed, there was no immediate prospect of expanding em-
pire unless migrants were attracted to England and the colonies or England re-engaged 
in state formation. In either case, Scotland was in pole position to benefit. Among shap-
ers of English colonial policy, Scottish commercial networks moved from being viewed 
as significant obstructions to trade to potential pillars of Empire28.
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coercive persuAsion
The renewal of war with France in the shape of the War of the Spanish Succession in 
1702 altered English viewpoints on how to service the fiscal-military state. The acqui-
sition of the Spanish Crown by Philip of Anjou, a grandson of Louis XIV, not only 
threatened to create a Bourbon hegemony in Europe, but also made the fate of the 
Spanish Empire a key issue of the war. The Spanish colonial administration opted for 
the French candidate, rather than the Hapsburg candidate – initially the Austrian Em-
peror, Leopold I – whom the English and the Dutch favoured. The English colonies in 
America were threatened by an arc of menace that stretched from the north Atlantic to 
the Gulf of Mexico and into the Caribbean. The longstanding French threat to English 
ventures from Hudson’s Bay and Newfoundland through to New England and New 
York now gained a southern dimension which bolstered the well worn Spanish antipa-
thy to Virginia and the Carolinas. The Nine Years War had severely debilitated the 
English colonial alliance with the league of Iroquois Nations and Louisiana had been 
established in 1699 as a French colonial intrusion in the Gulf of Mexico. The Carib-
bean remained particularly vulnerable thanks to the reluctance of the English ministry 
to commit troops and naval resources away from the main European theatres of war29. 
At the same time, the need to harmonize the plantation trade with English manufac-
turing as soldiers and sailors were being mobilized on an unprecedented scale for war, 
created a demographic deficit that was threatening to English interests in the long as 
well as the short term.
Although London had grown in the Restoration era to become Europe’s largest city, 
its population, estimated at 530,000, was apparently stagnating, as was that of England 
as a whole at no more than 5.5 million. These relatively accurate estimates were made 
by Gregory King in 1696 to demonstrate to the English ministry that England did not 
have the resources in population and national income to prolong war beyond 1698. 
King was not arguing that population was static. Population had shifted through in-
tensified, commercial agriculture and diversified manufacturing that had led to gradual 
urbanisation. However, the natural increase in population, which was seen as the basis 
of sustainable national prosperity, had been channelled towards emigration to Ireland 
and the American colonies30. The Board of Trade had been relatively sanguine about 
the prospects for a favourable balance of trade between 1698 and 1701. But the renewal 
of war in 1702 led to important shifts in fiscal policy31.
In the first place, the balance between direct and indirect taxes to underwrite the costs 
of the National Debt moved away from direct land tax - which had primarily sustained 
deficit financing during the Nine Years War - towards indirect taxes raised through cus-
toms and excise. This shift reflected not only the dominance of the landed influence in 
the English Parliament, but also the tilting of the balance in favour of the advocates of 
national prosperity through landed enterprise and manufacturing rather than through 
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overseas trade. In the second place, there was a shift in the nature of recruitment to the 
army if not the navy. While the Royal Navy was voted supplies for 40,000-42,000 men 
in both the Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession, ships of the line 
increased from 173 in 1688 to 224 by 1702. The army was raised from around 76,000 
to 92,000 men. Masked by this growth in military manpower was an increased reliance 
on foreign auxiliaries; that is, England was becoming more dependent on continental 
troops than those raised within the British Isles. Whereas 26% of the troops raised in 
the Nine Years War were foreign auxiliaries, their proportion fluctuated between 54 
and 67% during the War of the Spanish Succession when the bulk of the English troops 
were committed in the Low Countries and Germany. The Peninsular campaign in sup-
port of Portugal and Catalonia was predominantly fought by Irish and Scottish troops. 
The Italian front was left entirely to the allies.
As the prevailing strategy in both wars required the offensive commitment of both the 
army and the navy, costs rose significantly from an annual average of around £2.5 mil-
lion in the Nine Years War to over £4 million during the War of the Spanish Succession. 
Merchant shipping remained notoriously vulnerable to French privateers. The Bank 
of England was overstretched in 1696-97 and again in 1705. The prospect of renewed 
war led to a temporary stop on the circulation of paper credit in 1701. The associated 
market in government stocks integral to the National Debt remained highly volatile. 
From 1702 the armed forces in English service were provisioned through designated 
domestic and continental agents. Such a system of payments by subventions created 
significant opportunities for inflating expenses and manipulating exchange rates. Scot-
tish as well as English commercial networks were the beneficiaries32.
Demographic and fiscal pressures led to a renewed debate on the value of the colonial 
trade. The Board of Trade was especially concerned that the attraction of migrants to 
the American colonies was not only depriving English manufactures of skilled labour, 
but also mounting effective competition that undercut English products with respect 
to price, quality and fashion. Colonial manufactures not only impaired the balance 
of trade with the Americas, but also diminished the prospect of earning revenue from 
the re-export of colonial raw materials once manufactured in England. These concerns, 
which were first raised vociferously in 1702, became a regular feature of the Boards’ 
reports to the English Parliament through to the Union of 1707. Over the same pe-
riod, English agriculture and manufacturing experienced a war boom with increased 
demand for grain and textiles in Russia, the Low Countries and Germany, particularly 
as the Great Northern War dislocated grain supplies from the Baltic and textile produc-
tion in Saxony and Silesia; meanwhile, the discovery of gold in Brazil fuelled increased 
sales of goods to Portugal. But this boom also put a premium on retaining population 
rather than encouraging migration to the American colonies33.
If emigration was not to damage the basis for English national prosperity nor weaken 
its military commitments by land and sea, some alternative source of productive and re-
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liable people had to be found. French Protestant émigrés fitted both requirements, but 
in insufficient numbers. Ireland, whose population had reputedly increased in excess of 
2 million, largely through migration within the British Isles, was still predominantly 
Roman Catholic (at least 80% of the populace) and therefore deemed unsuitable. Al-
though its population had in all probability fallen to below a million, Scotland came 
into the position of favoured nation and was indeed identified as such. Calls for Scots 
to help ensure “a most Ample Encrease in the Wealth and Stock of England” won en-
dorsement from the American colonies34. In advance of the War of the Spanish Succes-
sion, and no doubt prompted by discreet lobbying on the part of Scottish commercial 
networks, planters in Barbados and the Leeward Islands had called for free trade with 
Scotland as a means of securing supplies of servants and militiamen. Colonial governors 
had also expressed their frustrations from 1703 that with English forces stretched to 
the limits they were disadvantaged by a continuing reluctance to give Scottish officers 
leading positions of command when confronting the French in the Caribbean. How-
ever, as well as complaints from Newfoundland that the Scots as well as the French were 
encroaching on English fisheries, there were also resurgent fears that clannish Scottish 
networks in Virginia, east New Jersey and Barbados especially were subverting English 
governance. On the one hand, colonial governors were pressing for the services of Scots 
from Maine and Nova Scotia to Jamaica and the Leeward Islands35. On the other hand, 
the English ministry was determined that initiatives to engage Scots in the Americas 
were only acceptable if firmly under English control. That price was political incorpora-
tion. If the Scots would not agree to treat for an incorporating union, their commercial 
networks were to be subject to the same punitive tariffs as foreign traders. In effect, the 
discrimination applied against Scottish networks in the colonies from 1696 was now to 
apply in England from 1705. Notwithstanding the common monarchy, the Scots were 
to be treated as aliens unless they accepted the English invitation to negotiate a Union. 
As a further means of coercive persuasion, the English ministry mobilised its troops on 
the Borders and across the North Channel in Ireland36.
In pushing for Union, the English ministry had several distinct advantages. They were 
clearly intent on political incorporation; they were prepared to use the resources of the 
English Treasury to influence Scottish politics; and they could rely on the support of 
key Scottish politicians whose thirst for power was enhanced by their lucrative play-
ing of the English marriage market37. Incorporation also offered a viable way out of 
the mercantilist constrictions of the Navigations Acts and nullified the threat of the 
discriminatory treatment of Scots as aliens; themes taken up by Scottish merchants 
resident in London, especially those with interests in colonial plantations. The removal 
of protective tariffs through free trade, though putting Scottish manufacturing and ex-
tractive industries at risk from English competition, opened up unfettered access to the 
English colonies. On the Scottish side, John Spreull from Glasgow, the city which was 
the main beneficiary of the illicit transatlantic trade, led a vigorous rebuttal of Scottish 
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vulnerability to discriminatory treatment on a global scale; a rebuttal which was rein-
forced by an attack from within the Scottish merchant community on the Anglo-Scot-
tish trading houses in London. The dubious prospect of free trade was not “a sufficient 
Equivalency for our Sovereignty, Independency and Laws”. A communication of trade 
through commercial confederation would allow the Scots to harmonise rather than 
subordinate their economic regulation to English interests38.
While there was a broad consensus against an incorporating union among the Scottish 
Estates as it entered what proved to be its last session in 1706-07, there was no agreed 
alternative with variations ranging from a federal executive to confederal legislatures39. 
Scots were not necessarily committed to a British constitutional settlement any more 
than they were convinced that parliamentary incorporation was the best guarantee of 
economic prosperity. In the final analysis, however, political initiative rested with Eng-
land, not Scotland. The making of the United Kingdom in 1707 was the product of 
power, control and negotiation. England had the military power to coerce and the fiscal 
power to persuade. The English ministry was intent on controlling through political in-
corporation what had become a rogue state in terms of commercial exchange. In return, 
Scottish manpower, Scottish enterprise and ultimately Scottish intellectual endeavour 
were harnessed in service of Empire40.
conclusion
Scottish overseas connections and mercantile activities between the Restoration of 
1660 and the Union of 1707 offer a corrective to the narrow focus on empire that 
results from a preoccupation with conflicts for colonial hegemony, such as the territo-
rial aggressiveness of England in competition with Spain (and Portugal), France and 
the Netherlands or even Denmark and Sweden. The distinctive activities of the Scots, 
no less than the Irish, the Flemings, the Norwegians, the Finns, the Poles and the Jews, 
like that of adventurers from Italian city states or colonists from German principalities, 
were not exclusively tied to the service of one imperial power. In the case of the Scots, 
their association with the English in the Americas did contribute to the British charac-
ter of the Stuarts’ overseas dominions, but did not preclude their association with the 
Swedes and the Dutch on the Delaware, with the Dutch in Brazil, New Amsterdam, 
Surinam and Tobago, and with the Danes in St Thomas.
Scottish circumvention of the English Navigation Acts, an ongoing rather than an oc-
casional process between 1660 and 1707, had not only linked traditional markets in 
northern Europe with the Americas but also rehabilitated the importance of political 
economy in effecting the United Kingdom of Great Britain. The accomplishment of 
Union signposted a collective crisis of political will among Scots to pursue a separate 
commercial agenda, not an entrepreneurial lack of ambition. The British nature of the 
Empire was reasserted through Scottish networks within an English governmental 
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framework. State power was now to be consolidated without internal disruption. Thus, 
once Union was formally accomplished on 1 May 1707, the governors in all the North 
American and Caribbean colonies were sent strict instructions that the Treaty was to be 
observed to the letter. The Gothic realities of British state formation were expressed ap-
positely to Governor James Handasyd of Jamaica by the Board of Trade and Plantations 
on 9 May: “Scotchmen are thereby to be looked upon for the future as Englishmen to 
all intents and purposes whatsoever”41.
However the Union did not end the illicit trading activities of Scottish commercial 
networks. Unrestricted access to the American colonies after 1707 certainly enabled 
Glasgow merchants to secure dominance in the tobacco trade, primarily by expand-
ing the store system under which the merchant rather than the planter bore the risk of 
trans-Atlantic shipping. Whitehaven, hitherto third after Bristol and Liverpool in the 
Atlantic trade, was so eclipsed by Glasgow merchants’ use of the store system in tan-
dem with smuggling mainly through the Isle of Man, that the Cumbrian town actually 
petitioned for repeal of the Treaty of Union in 1710. The Glasgow merchants took ad-
vantage of drawbacks on British customs for re-exporting tobacco by shipping out huge 
quantities to the Isle of Man and then bringing small amounts back illicitly to ports in 
the south-west of Scotland. Likewise, Scottish entrepreneurs duly extended the store 
system perfected by the Glasgow tobacco lords into the Caribbean in order to enhance 
profits from sugar and rum by fair means or foul42.
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source
This document reveals how English colonial officials were becoming increasingly agitated 
by Scottish plans to rival the English East India Company, to colonise Darien on the Pana-
ma Isthmus, and to continue circumventing the English Navigation Acts in North America, 
particularly through commercial networks operating on the southern shores of Delaware 
Bay.
Memorial of Edward Randolph, Surveyor-General of the Customs in the American Colonies to 
the Commissioners of Customs, 1695.
In my paper of proposals to suppress the illegal trade in the Tobacco Plantations, which has 
been carried on from thence directly to Scotland for many years, I have shewn from whence 
it has so greatly prevailed, and laid down proper methods for preventing thereof for ye fu-
ture . . . which will be effectually remedied if they were formed into an Act of Parliament to 
be passed this Session, and entitled an Act for preventing Frauds and regulating Abuses in 
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the Plantation Trade as in the Act of 14 Car.2nd [14th year of the reign of Charles II, 1663] 
for England, and that the commanders of his Majesty’s Ships of War, during their stay in 
the country, may be ordered to receive instructions from this Board in what may concern 
the trade and navigation to and from those Plantations, and to be aiding and assisting to the 
officers of his Majesties Customs in the execution of their Duties.
I now lay before ye Honours an account of the present state of his Majesty’s Colonies and 
Provinces upon the north coast of America in Relation to a Scotch Act which is lately 
passed; in which Act, under pretence of erecting an East India Company in that kingdom, 
they do . . . engage themselves in great sums of money in an American trade; a trade which 
has already for several years been carried on by Scotchmen, under pretence of being persons 
born within the allegiance of his Majesty as by Act of 12 Car 2nd [12th year of Charles II, 
1660] they claim liberty to do. And although in the act of the 14th of the same King only 
English, Irish and Subjects in the Plantations are to be accounted English, as to the navigat-
ing of ships, yet they take on them to come from Scotland under the notion of Super-car-
goes and merchants, and seldom fail of counterfeit masters.
. . . they have liberty to plant colonies . . . in or upon places not inhabited, and in or upon 
places inhabited, . . . to make and conclude treaties of peace and commerce with the Gov-
ernors and Proprietors, paying only to his Majesty out of Scotland the yearly acknowledg-
ment of one hogshead of tobacco. And, although they forbid all other Scots than those of 
their Company to touch on any plantations which they shall acquire, on pain of confisca-
tion, yet they allow all such Scots to trade in tobacco and sugar elsewhere (that is to say 
amongst the English), they paying for what they so bring home such duties as are now 
established in Scotland.
By all which it may be presumed how thy project to let themselves into the trade of all his 
Majesties plantations, and it is probable they meditate either the purchasing a settlement 
in one of the three lower counties of Newcastle, Kent, or Sussex, on the southern shore of 
Delaware Bay, as being no part or parcel of the lands granted to Mr [William] Penn in his 
Province of Pennsylvania or in some one or more islands near the Continent, by which 
expedient, if acquired, they might in a short time make a staple not only of all sorts of Eu-
ropean manufactures, but also of the enumerated plantation commodities, even as it is this 
day practised with great abuse at the small Dutch Island of Carasaw [Curaçao]
From: Historical Manuscripts Commission, MSS of the House of Lords, new series, vol. 2 
(1695-97), C.L. Anstruther & H.P. St. John (eds.), (London 1903), p.447; another version 
is to be found in the Huntington Library, Bridgewater & Ellesmere Papers, EL 9880.
